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Noisy Signals; Latin 
America
Abstract
Many governments across Latin America have been unable to reduce 
stubbornly high levels of labor informality and the lack of legal and social 
protection has put informal workers in a situation of continuous economic 
peril and uncertainty. This paper argues that the inherent characteristics 
and conditions of informal workers act as noisy signals that diminish the 
effect that economic perceptions have on evaluations of the incumbent 
executive across Latin American countries. The empirical results support 
the argument, suggesting that the effect of perceptions of the econo-
my on evaluations of the incumbent is lower among informal relative to 
formal workers. Furthermore, this dynamic is prevalent in urban areas 
where there is a more evident differentiation between formal and infor-
mal workers, and disappears in rural areas, where both formal and infor-
mal workers face challenges that produce noisy signals and diminish the 
effect of perceptions of the economy on evaluations of the incumbent.
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Varios gobiernos en América Latina han sido incapaces de reducir los altos 
niveles de informalidad laboral y de proveer protecciones sociales y legales 
que contribuyan a disminuir la vulnerabilidad e incertidumbre de trabajado-
res informales. Este ensayo argumenta que las inherentes condiciones de 
trabajadores informales actúan como señales ruidosas decreciendo el efec-
to que percepciones de la economía tiene sobre evaluaciones del trabajo 
del ejecutivo en países latinoamericanos. Los resultados empíricos soportan 
el argumento, indicando que el efecto de percepciones económicas sobre 
evaluaciones del trabajo del ejecutivo es menor entre trabajadores infor-
males en comparación con trabajadores formales. Adicionalmente, estos 
resultados son más prevalentes en áreas urbanas donde hay una más clara 
diferenciación entre trabajadores formales e informales, y menos prevalen-
te en áreas rurales. En estas últimas, ambos grupos, trabajadores formales 
e informales, se enfrentan a retos que producen señales ruidosas disminu-
yendo el efecto que percepciones de la economía tiene sobre las evaluacio-










Vários governos na América Latina não conseguiram reduzir os altos níveis 
de informalidade do trabalho e fornecer proteções sociais e legais que con-
tribuam para reduzir a vulnerabilidade e a incerteza dos trabalhadores infor-
mais. Este ensaio argumenta que as condições inerentes aos trabalhadores 
informais atuam como sinais ruidosos, diminuindo o efeito que as percep-
ções da economia têm nas avaliações do trabalho executivo nos países lati-
no-americanos. Os resultados empíricos corroboram o argumento, indican-
do que o efeito das percepções econômicas sobre as avaliações do trabalho 
executivo é menor entre os trabalhadores informais em comparação com 
os trabalhadores formais. Além disso, esses resultados são mais relevantes 
em áreas urbanas onde há uma diferenciação mais clara entre trabalhadores 
formais e informais, e menos prevalentes em áreas rurais. Nestas, ambos os 
grupos, trabalhadores formais e informais, enfrentam desafios que produ-
zem sinais ruidosos, reduzindo o efeito dessas percepções que a economia 
tem sobre as avaliações sobre o desempenho do executivo pelos cidadãos.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most well-founded theoretical and empirical propositions in politi-
cal science suggests the economy influences people’s support for the incumbent 
leader (Stokes, 1963). Nevertheless, empirical results have shown this relationship 
to be far from simple, with many other factors conditioning the link between the 
economy and citizens’ vote or support for the incumbent (Anderson, 2007). Some 
researchers suggest the importance of the country’s political context as a contin-
gent element in the relationship of the economy and voting behavior (Anderson, 
2000; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Singer, 2011). Others 
point out individual traits, such as political sophistication, as a relevant conditional 
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factor (Alt et al., 2016; Gomez & Wilson, 2001, 2006). More recently, academics 
have investigated how the information environment or nature of the sources of 
information can meddle in the logic of economic voting (Alt et al., 2016; Carlin et 
al., 2021). However, more work focusing on the structural composition of socie-
ties could help us understand the moderating dynamics of economic evaluations 
of political leaders.
The extant literature provides empirical evidence supporting the argument 
that the economy plays a relevant role when individuals assess the performance 
of the incumbent executive in Latin American countries (Cabezas & Navia, 2019; 
Lewis-Beck & Ratto, 2013). Nevertheless, few analyses examine how a critical 
structural factor in the region, specifically job informality, affects the logic of eco-
nomic voting. I argue that the inherent job insecurity and economic vulnerability 
of informal workers, their limited capacity to access social services, and their dis-
connection from the government, overall, act as noisy signals that diminish the 
effect that perceptions of the economy have on evaluations of the incumbent ex-
ecutive. The vulnerable reality of informal workers and the lack of economic and 
legal linkage to their governments make it difficult for such citizens to connect the 
government’s actions and policies to personal and national economic outcomes. 
Consequently, informal workers downplay the importance of national economic 
performance when assessing the incumbent’s job.
To test the proposed argument, I use public opinion survey data from 17 Latin 
American countries in the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Ameri-
casBarometer 2018-19 wave, which uniquely provides a region-wide direct meas-
ure of job informality along with individuals’ perceptions of the economy and ex-
ecutive approval. The empirical results support my argument, indicating that the 
effect of perceptions of the economy, egotropic or sociotropic, on the evaluation 
of the incumbent executive is lower among informal rather than formal workers. 
Furthermore, this dynamic is most prevalent in urban areas where there may be 
a more evident differentiation regarding the role of the government in mediating 
the economic relations and providing social benefits across formal and informal 
workers. The importance of these results lies in the indication that salient struc-
tural characteristics of a region, such as informality in Latin America, might meddle 
in the dynamics of well-established theoretical and empirical propositions such as 
economic political accountability of incumbents. In the specific case of this work, 
if a group of individuals faces a harder time identifying how an incumbent helps 
the economy and their economic interests, these individuals will be similarly un-
able to hold the incumbent accountable for her economic performance while in 
office. Thus, incumbents’ focus on economic outputs and policies appeal more 
strongly to workers in the formal sector, who in turn, will place greater weight on 
economic factors in their calculus to evaluate incumbents.
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Going forward, the paper has the following structure: First, I provide a con-
ceptual definition of labor informality, the sources of vulnerability of informal 
workers, and how political science scholars have analyzed labor informality. Sec-
ond, I review the small literature that examines the relationship between vulner-
ability and economic voting and assesses how labor informality relates to these 
works. Third, I provide an alternative theoretical argument challenging the com-
mon academic expectation linking individual vulnerability and labor informality to 
economic voting. Fourth, I develop an empirical analysis that tests the proposed 
argument, discuss the results, and conclude. 
A REVIEW OF LABOR INFORMALITY
Informal workers are generally defined as those workers who do not have 
contracts that have specific rules regarding the length of their jobs or stipulation 
of job security such as notice periods, severance payments, and/or definitions of 
just causes of dismissal (Gasparini & Tornarolli, 2009; Pages & Marquez, 1998). 
Additionally, because informal workers do not make social security contributions, 
they often do not have access to key social security benefits such as retirement or 
health insurance (Gasparini & Tornarolli, 2009; Gideon, 2007; Mesa-Lago, 2009; 
OECD et al., 2016; Salazar-Xirinachs & Chacaltana, 2018; Tokman, 2007). The 
lack of legal protections and social safety net resources put informal workers in a 
more vulnerable position than formal workers. This vulnerability has implications 
in various aspects of their jobs and wellbeing. First, the duration of informal jobs 
is shorter relative to formal jobs, and the likelihood of informal workers becom-
ing unemployed is higher than that of formal workers (Bosch & Maloney, 2010). 
Second, informal workers often do not benefit from increases in minimum wages 
(Gindling & Terrell, 2005), which might be a contributing reason for the lower sala-
ries they obtain compared to formal workers (Daza & Gamboa, 2013; Gasparini & 
Tornarolli, 2009).
Beyond the vulnerability generated by the absence of legal protections, infor-
mal workers' exclusion from social security benefits is another source of hardship. 
Informality does not translate into complete denial of access to social protection as 
in previous decades. Governments in the region have implemented various redis-
tributive programs for those individuals outside of the formal contributory frame-
work (Holland & Schneider, 2017). For instance, most countries in Latin America 
have some sort of noncontributory and conditional cash transfer programs in 
place for the unemployed and most vulnerable (Dodlova et al., 2018). Nonethe-
less, these programs are insufficient to provide comparable social benefits to the 
ones formal workers obtain, or inadequate to mitigate the inherent insecurities 
and vulnerabilities of labor informality. For instance, an informal worker does not 
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receive severance payments for being laid off, nor does she receive unemploy-
ment insurance when she is out of work. Conditional cash transfer programs can 
help to mitigate the absence of income related to the work of individuals, but the 
coverage of these programs is low and often fails to reach even 50 percent of the 
people who need them (Robles et al., 2019).
Political scientists have already inquired how labor informality affects the po-
litical preferences, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals in Latin America. Some 
of these works find that informal workers are not different from formal workers 
regarding their political engagement, ideology, support for noncontributory so-
cial programs (Baker & Velasco-Guachalla, 2018), or preferences for redistribu-
tion (Berens, 2015). However, informal workers in Latin America are more skepti-
cal about labor laws’ protective capacity and less likely to vote than their formal 
counterparts (Berens & Kemmerling, 2019). Additionally, evidence suggests that 
informal workers’ inherent state of uncertainty and vulnerability has caused an 
erosion of the linkages between these workers and political parties across the 
Latin American region (Altamirano, 2019). 
In sum, the lack of legal and social protection of informal workers put them 
in a situation of continuous job insecurity and economic vulnerability. While gov-
ernments across Latin America have implemented conditional cash transfer and 
noncontributory programs as strategies to help the most vulnerable individuals, 
the utility of these programs for informal workers is limited and insufficient to 
mitigate the adverse effects of working informally. Furthermore, evidence sug-
gests that labor informality has implications in some aspects of the political life of 
individuals but not in others. The task put forward by this paper is identifying the 
moderating effect of labor informality on economic voting in Latin America.
LABOR INFORMALITY AND ECONOMIC VOTING
In Latin America, the stubbornly high levels of labor informality and lack of 
legal and social protection that put informal workers in a situation of continuous 
economic peril and uncertainty might play an important role in meddling in the 
logic of economic voting and evaluations of incumbents. To evaluate this potential 
contingent effect, it is important to understand first some common assumptions 
that provide a theoretical base to the postulate of economic voting. First, voters 
must recognize incumbent leaders are responsible for the economic performance 
of the country (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Powell & Whitten, 1993). Scholars have 
evaluated this assumption finding, for instance, that when executive leaders have 
little control over the effects of the world economy on the domestic economy, 
voters will not hold these leaders accountable (Carlin & Hellwig, 2020); and when 
the political and institutional context provides greater clarity of the role of the 
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executive on the economic outputs, the influence of economic factors on execu-
tive approval increase (Selios, 2019). Second, the economy must be a salient issue 
for individuals for them to consider it when they evaluate the incumbent. Empirical 
evidence suggests that this is the case (Singer, 2011), and it is not just the salience 
of the economy, but what economic element (e.g., economic growth, inflation, 
or unemployment) is relevant at the time (Singer, 2013a). Third, individuals must 
expect the performance of the economy will eventually affect their wellbeing. 
This assumption suggests individuals are self-interested, and when they evaluate 
the national economy, they might do it thinking about the impact it would end up 
having on their welfare rather than thinking from an altruistic perspective (Kiewiet 
& Lewis-Beck, 2011; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981:132).
When analyzing the previous assumptions with a focus on vulnerable indi-
viduals, scholars have suggested that the economy more strongly influences their 
evaluation of the incumbent leaders relative to less vulnerable individuals. The 
basic idea is based on the higher risk exposure of vulnerable individuals to eco-
nomic shocks (Fossati, 2014; Singer, 2013b). Singer (2013a) examines vulnerabil-
ity from the perspective of job insecurity and employability. He mentions that 
workers who feel anxious about their job situation and stability, and workers who 
believe they will not find a similar job if they get laid off will “benefit from a strong 
economy that makes job losses less likely and creates opportunities should a job 
dislocation occur” (p. 149). As a consequence, they consider the economy a salient 
issue since shifts in the economy will put their wellbeing at risk.
Informal workers can be categorized as vulnerable individuals. These workers, 
as previously discussed, are more likely to be unemployed, the duration of their 
job is shorter than formal workers, and they do not have strong social protections 
that help them to cope with potential economic dislocations. Therefore, consid-
ering the argued impact that vulnerability has on the logic of economic voting, 
informal workers would, theoretically, rely more strongly on the economic perfor-
mance of the country when evaluating an incumbent executive than less vulner-
able individuals such as formal workers. 
H1. The effect of perceptions of the economy on assessments of the executive will 
be higher for informal rather than formal workers.
While some of the existing literature supports the previous expectation, 
certain empirical and theoretical reasons shed some doubt on it. First, the only 
empirical analysis, to my knowledge, that directly tests the contingent effect of 
job informality in the logic of economic voting suffers from an issue of external 
validity. Singer (2016) test this expectation using survey data from Argentina in 
the year 2005 during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner. In the 2003 Argentinian 
presidential elections, when Kirchner was elected president, the country was in 
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the immediate aftermath of a severe financial crisis. Kirchner was able to promote 
economic recuperation “exceeding pre-crisis levels [of growth] within a year of 
the start of his administration” (Wylde, 2011, p. 438). An economic crisis as deep 
as the Argentinian case is an extreme circumstance that can condition voters' be-
havior, including informal workers, in ways not likely replicable in more stable eco-
nomic circumstances (Singer, 2013a). Hence, the results Singer obtained might not 
be generalizable, and an empirical test beyond the specifics of Argentina in 2005 
may show a different pattern linking informality and economic voting/approval.
If Argentina in 2005 is not representative of the general conditions of infor-
mality and politics in Latin America, what might we expect of the link between 
one’s nature of employment and economic voting/approval in more “normal” 
times. Contrary to what Singer (2016) finds, there are theoretical reasons to ex-
pect that the effect of the perceptions of the economy on executive approval 
in more “normal” times is weaker among informal workers than formal workers. 
These reasons are related to the information informal workers receive from their 
environment. In short, the following argument suggests that while informal work-
ers can perceive that the economic situation of the country is good, they face a 
harder time inferring the responsibility of the incumbent in producing such per-
formance, and redistributing the gains, given their particular disconnection with 
the government apparatus. 
The state of the economy has implications for citizens’ evaluation of an in-
cumbent when they perceive that the economic situation of a nation is principally 
due to the competency of the executive and not for an external shock (Duch & 
Stevenson, 2008).  In addition, voters not only care about the government’s abil-
ity to supply macro-economic outcomes, but also how such economic outcomes 
influence their wellbeing (Kiewiet & Lewis-Beck, 2011; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981, 
p. 132), which implies the capacity of executives to effectively redistribute such 
gains among the population. Hence, assuming that individuals are self-interested 
(Feldman, 1984; Kramer, 1983), they will reward incumbents they consider re-
sponsible for the current state of the economy and the redistribution of gains to 
national accounts (Carlin et al., forthcoming). 
Informal workers’ linkages with the government and various other political 
actors are looser (Altamirano, 2019) compared to other groups of society, such as 
formal workers. As the government is absent in mediating many of the economic 
relations of informal workers, the information to provide clarity of the responsibil-
ity of incumbents in generating economic outcomes becomes sparse for workers 
in the informal sector. To put it in other words, the lack of job security informal 
workers face being outside of the legal protective framework offered to formal 
sector works, and the economic volatility and vulnerability caused by the lack of 
mechanisms to shift economic risks and decrease future economic uncertainty 
(e.g., unemployment insurances and retirement programs), make the government 
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an absent actor in the economic interactions of informal workers. Since these 
daily economic interactions importantly contribute to shaping individuals’ percep-
tions of the economy (Ansolabehere et al., 2014), and the government is gener-
ally absent from such interactions, informal workers will downplay the extent to 
which they consider the incumbent executive influences their perceived state of 
the economy. 
All in all, as the government is an absent actor in the day-to-day of infor-
mal workers, this absence acts as a noisy signal regarding the competency of the 
government and incumbent executive in influencing economic outcomes at the 
personal and national level. Consequently, while informal workers might perceive 
that the country’s economic performance is improving, they will not importantly 
attribute this improvement to the competency of the incumbent, neither will they 
expect that the government will redistribute such gains to them. Thus, informal 
workers will diminish the influence of economic factors when evaluating the in-
cumbent leader’s job compared to formal workers.
H2. The effect of perceptions of the economy on assessments of the executive will 
be lower for informal rather than formal workers.
DATA AND METHODS
For the empirical evaluation of the proposed hypotheses, I use survey data 
from 17 Latin American countries1 in the Latin America Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) AmericasBarometer 2018-19 wave2, with a sample size of 26,734 obser-
vations. This cross-national survey is unique in that it includes measures for labor 
informality, executive approval and perceptions of the economy. The dependent 
1. The countries included in this analysis are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and 
Dominican Republic.
2. The 2006 and 2008 LAPOP waves also include some measures that might tap on the concept of 
labor informality. Nevertheless, these measures are not the same than the one in the 2018/19 wave. 
More specifically, the 2006 wave asks whether a person has social security, dismissing whether this 
social security comes from the payment of social security contributions or from other sources such 
as spouses or non-contributory programs of the state. The 2008 measure, on the other hand, asks 
whether a person has health insurance through the company they work for or from their employer. 
This question, however, might exclude those formal workers who are self-employed and still pay social 
security contributions, or have other type of formal contracts that require workers themselves to pay 
the social security contributions. Additionally, the 2006 and 2008 waves do not allow for the inclusion 
of controls such as help and/or partisanship.
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variable in this analysis is approval, which is scaled from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates 
very poor approval of the president and 4 is very high approval3. 
Among the explanatory variables are sociotropic and egotropic retrospective 
evaluations of the economy, which are scaled from 0 to 2 with 0 indicating the 
economy is worse than the previous year, 1 is about the same, and 2 is better than 
the previous year. The decision to include perceptions of the personal economy 
as a relevant explanatory variable is because this paper assumes that individuals 
assess the extent to which their personal economic conditions are attributable to 
government actors' efforts (Gomez & Wilson, 2006). Additionally, I include the 
variable formality, a categorical variable indicating whether a respondent is an in-
formal worker, a formal worker, unemployed, or belongs to another category. To 
categorize informal workers, this analysis uses a legalistic definition of informality 
which classifies as informal workers those who do not have access to a pension 
linked to their employment (Gasparini & Tornarolli, 2009, p. 21). More specifically, 
the LAPOP questions allow me to classify informal workers as those who either 
themselves or their employers do not make contributions towards pension or re-
tirement. For the empirical evaluation of the proposed hypotheses, I include an 
interactive term between the variables sociotropic/egotropic and formality (socio-
tropic/egotropic*formality) to identify whether the effect of perceptions of the 
economy on executive approval differs between formal and informal workers. 
Such interactive terms serve as the principal explanatory variables in the Models.
Finally, I control for standard demographic and political factors such as educa-
tion, measured in years of education. Male, where 0 is female and 1 is male. Age, 
measured in years. Skin color4, which is an ordinal variable from 0 to 10 where 
higher values indicate darker skin. Material wealth5, which is an ordinal variable 
from 1 to 5 (higher numbers indicate more material wealth) that measures rela-
tive wealth quintiles, based on individuals’ ownership of various household assets. 
Partisanship, which is a dichotomous variable where 0 indicates that a person does 
not sympathize with the party of the incumbent, and 1 indicates a person sym-
pathizes with the party of the incumbent. Lastly, I control for whether a person 
receives any periodic monetary or another type of assistance by the government, 
and it is captured by the dichotomous variable help where 0 indicates that the 
person does not receive governmental help, and 1 indicates that the person does.
3. The wording of the dependent and explanatory variables can be found in the supplementary 
material.
4. Skin color is not a common control included in many works of Latin American politics. Nevertheless, 
studies have shown that skin color play a role in influencing electoral dynamics (e.g. Johnson, 2020). In 
this paper, the expectation is that skin color relates to socioeconomic disparities (Flores & Telles, 2012; 
Telles et al., 2015), which in turn, might influence how individuals evaluate the incumbent.
5. For more information on the measure of the variable material wealth see Córdova (2009).
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Since the data I use is structured with individual respondents nested within 
countries, and thus likely to violate OLS assumptions, I use a hierarchical approach 
for all models presented in the paper. Specifically, hierarchical linear models are 
fit with country-level random intercept and makes no assumptions regarding the 
covariance structure between panels. 
RESULTS
The results from the hierarchical models can be observed in Table 1. Baseline 
Model 1 presents results of the effect of sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of 
the economy over evaluations of the executive. While both egotropic and socio-
tropic evaluations are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, 
the coefficient of the variable sociotropic is a little more than twice the coefficient 
of the variable egotropic, holding all the other variables constant. In other words, 
going from an evaluation of the national economy of worse (0) to better (2) rela-
tive to the previous year increases an individual’s evaluation of the performance 
of the executive by .73 on the 0 to 4 scale of the dependent variable approval. On 
the other hand, going from an evaluation of the personal economy of worse (0) to 
better (2), the increase in executive approval is around .34. These results support 
previous evidence indicating that sociotropic evaluations of the economy have a 
more relevant effect on executive approval than egotropic evaluations (Kinder & 
Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1986; Lewis-Beck & Ratto, 2013).
Models 2 and 3, Table 1, test the competing hypotheses 1 and 2. The interac-
tive term between the variable sociotropic and the category for informal workers 
in Model 2, suggests that the effect of sociotropic evaluations of the economy is 
weaker among informal workers relative to formal workers, and this difference 
is statistically significant at conventional levels. Figure 1, left panel, additionally, 
graphs the coefficients of the effect of sociotropic evaluations on executive ap-
proval across informal and formal workers, indicating that the coefficient of the 
variable sociotropic is 0.35 for informal workers and 0.42 for formal workers.  The 
interactive variable between egotropic and informal workers on Model 3, shows 
the effect of egotropic perceptions of the economy is weaker among informal 
relative to formal workers and this difference is statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. Figure 1, right panel, depicts the coefficients of egotropic evalu-
ations on the executive approval scale for informal and formal workers, showing 
that the coefficient of the variable egotropic for informal workers is 0.16 and the 
coefficient of the variable egotropic for formal workers is 0.22. 
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Other †‡ 0.043** 0.097*** 0.119***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.024)
Unemployed † 0.056** 0.096*** 0.078***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.029)
Informal † 0.018 0.062*** 0.073***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.026)
Sociotropic 0.365*** 0.429*** 0.366***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010)
Egotropic 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.225***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018)
Other * Sociotropic †‡ -0.092***
(0.022)
Unemployed * Sociotropic † -0.066**
(0.032)
Informal * Sociotropic † -0.074***
(0.024)
Other * Egotropic †‡ -0.093***
(0.022)
Unemployed * Egotropic † -0.004
(0.031)
Informal * Egotropic † -0.064***
(0.023)
Help 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Education -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skin Color -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
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Material Wealth -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Partisanship 0.766*** 0.765*** 0.766***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant 1.738*** 1.697*** 1.690***
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Random Effect Parameters
Var (Constant) 0.085 0.085 0.085
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Var (Residual) 0.887 0.887 0.887
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 26,734 26,734 26,734
Number of groups 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: † Formal workers is the base category.
‡ Within the category other are included students, retired people, and other groups 
beyond the specified.
Source: own elaboration
In general, the previous evidence suggests that informal workers are no more 
reliant than formal workers on perceptions of the national or personal economy 
to evaluate the executive's performance, contradicting previous empirical find-
ings (Singer, 2016). Instead, the results provide evidence that the effects of so-
ciotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy on executive approval are 
weaker among informal relative to formal workers, providing empirical support to 
hypothesis 2. 
Finally, Table 1, Model 2 shows that the effect of the variable sociotropic 
on executive approval is lower for the unemployed compared to formal workers. 
While this result is interesting, I do not discuss or theorize about the differential 
effect of perceptions of the economy on evaluations of the incumbent beyond the 
groups formal and informal, as it goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1. Effects of the Variables Sociotropic and Egotropic on Approval  






































DIFFERENCES ACROSS URBAN AND RURAL AREAS
In an effort to check the robustness of the theoretical findings outlined above, 
I use the same dataset to examine another implication of the theoretical argument 
outlined above. In particular, differences in the effect of formality on economic 
political attribution between urban and rural regions. Latin American countries 
are often characterized by welfare regimes with uneven outcomes across rural 
and urban areas, in part due to the social reforms which disproportionally bene-
fited skilled and organized workers in urban areas (Carnes, 2014; Collier & Col-
lier, 2002). This legacy, potentially, contributes to varying degrees of subnational 
inequality6 across territorial subunits within countries in the region (Otero-Ba-
hamon, 2019). Worsened in some cases by policies that are not place-sensitive7, 
6. With subnational inequality inequality, the author refers to the provision of public goods such as 
education, health, sanitation, and opportunity that relate to social development. (p. 189)
7. With place-sensitivity, the author refers to such policies that consider specific features of the na-
tion’s territories in the design of the policy, impacting the success of the social outcomes that such 
policies will have across various different territories of a nation (Otero-Bahamon, 2020).
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influencing suboptimal service provisions and an overall lower presence of the 
government in rural, poor, and marginal areas compared to more urban territorial 
subunits (Otero-Bahamon, 2020). 
In practice, one implication of the uneven conditions across urban and ru-
ral areas is the extent to which individuals in rural and urban areas consider 
the government a relevant economic actor. As mentioned previously, this paper 
assumes that individuals care about the competency of the incumbent in pro-
ducing economic outcomes and redistributing economic gains to evaluate the 
incumbent. Because rural areas tend to have an overall lower presence of the 
government, and the provision of benefits formal workers are entitled to are 
comparatively worse than for formal workers in urban areas, formal workers in 
rural areas should have interactions with the state economic apparatus more 
similar to informal than urban formal workers. Therefore, similarly to informal 
workers, formal workers in rural areas will have a challenging time identifying 
the competency of the government is generating economic outcomes and re-
distributing national economic gains to them. Hence, for rural residents of both 
employment conditions, economic evaluations will represent noisy signals and 
mute somewhat the larger effect that perceptions of the economy have on eval-
uations of the incumbent for formal workers in rural areas. To test this expecta-
tion, I develop additional Models separating the sample between rural and urban 
areas, as can be observed in Table 2.
From the results in Table 2, Models 4 and 6, we see that in rural areas the ef-
fects of both sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy on executive 
approval are not significantly different for informal and formal workers. But in 
urban areas, Models 5 and 7 suggest the effect of sociotropic and egotropic per-
ceptions of the economy on incumbents’ approval is statistically weaker among 
informal workers than formal workers. In short, these results provide evidence 
suggesting that the difference in the effects of perceptions of the economy on 
approval across formal and informal workers should be more noticeable in urban 
areas, and get somewhat muted in rural areas.
Figure 2 shows the effect of sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the 
economy on approval differs for formal and informal workers in urban but not ru-
ral areas. However, we also see that the effect of either socio or egotropic evalu-
ations of formal sector workers is not significantly different between urban and 
rural areas. Neither is it significantly different for informal workers. With the ca-
veats, these results provide suggestive evidence that the difference in the effect 
that sociotropic and egotropic evaluations between formal and informal workers 
is somewhat muted in rural contexts. Further work examining the specific rel-
evant factors that differ between urban and rural areas is needed to further refine 
and test the proposed mechanism.
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Other †‡ 0.085* 0.090*** 0.091* 0.118***
(0.044) (0.024) (0.051) (0.028)
Unemployed † 0.084 0.094*** 0.020 0.092***
(0.055) (0.031) (0.060) (0.034)
Informal † 0.025 0.066** 0.034 0.078***
(0.046) (0.026) (0.052) (0.029)
Sociotropic 0.372*** 0.439*** 0.309*** 0.384***
(0.043) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012)
Egotropic 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.211*** 0.225***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.041) (0.020)
Other * Sociotropic †‡ -0.096** -0.079***
(0.048) (0.026)
Unemployed * Sociotropic † -0.075 -0.057
(0.066) (0.037)
Informal * Sociotropic † -0.042 -0.074***
(0.051) (0.028)
Other * Egotropic †‡ -0.077* -0.091***
(0.046) (0.025)
Unemployed * Egotropic † 0.059 -0.025
(0.061) (0.035)
Informal * Egotropic † -0.042 -0.065**
(0.049) (0.026)
Help 0.152*** 0.067*** 0.150*** 0.067***
(0.035) (0.023) (0.035) (0.023)
Education -0.006* -0.011*** -0.006* -0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Male -0.045* -0.036** -0.045* -0.036**
(0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014)
Age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Skin Color -0.008 -0.013*** -0.008 -0.013***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Material Wealth -0.015* -0.032*** -0.015* -0.032***
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(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Partisanship 0.674*** 0.800*** 0.675*** 0.800***
(0.038) (0.025) (0.038) (0.025)
Constant 1.658*** 1.613*** 1.666*** 1.601***
(0.108) (0.085) (0.110) (0.086)
Random Effect Parameters
Var (Constant) 0.097 0.088 0.098 0.088
(0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030)
Var (Residual) 0.867 0.889 0.867 0.888
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 7,155 19,579 7,155 19,579
Number of groups 17 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: † Formal workers is the base category.
‡ Within the category others are included students, retired people, and other groups 
beyond the specified.
Source: own elaboration
It is important to clarify the extent of the information all the empirical mod-
els in this paper conveys, and some of its limitations. First, while the theoretical 
propositions provided in this manuscript suggest that the lower effect of eco-
nomic perceptions on evaluations of the incumbent is due to noisy signals preve-
nient from the disconnection between informal workers and the government, this 
analysis cannot make claims of causality as does not test this causal link directly. 
Hence, this paper mainly presents evidence of the expected relationship, but fur-
ther analyses that directly test the proposed theoretical mechanism are necessary 
to identify causality. Second, in the years (2018/19) when the surveys used for 
this analysis were fielded, many countries in Latin America were having electoral 
competitions for president. These specific electoral contexts might condition the 
generalizability of these results, and future analyses using data from other time 
frames might be necessary. Third, heterogeneity among informal workers might 
affect the logic of the outlined relationship. However, making typologies of in-
formal workers and accounting for the differential effect of this heterogeneity is 
beyond the scope of this paper and future works are necessary for this.
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Figure 2. Effects of the Variables Sociotropic and Egotropic on Approval Across 











































































Individuals rely more strongly on evaluations of the economy to evaluate in-
cumbent leaders when they identify that the economic outcomes of the nation 
are the competency of the incumbent (Duch & Stevenson, 2008). This paper ar-
gues that the absence of the government in the day-to-day economic interactions 
of informal workers makes it harder for them to identify the responsibility of the 
incumbent in producing economic outcomes they perceive for themselves and 
their nation. These evaluations become noisy signals of the leadership’s compe-
tency for informal workers, limiting the extent to which they use perceptions of 
the economy to evaluate incumbent executives. 
Empirically, this paper offers support to the theorized argument that infor-
mal workers rely less on sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy 
when evaluating the executive compared to formal workers. Additionally, in rural 
areas, where the government is more likely to be an absent actor and the provi-
sion of benefits to formal workers is less than in urban areas, the effect of ego-
tropic and sociotropic evaluations of the economy have on presidential approval 
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is somewhat muted. Overall, the empirical results regarding labor formality and 
economic-based presidential approval support the new hypothesis (#2) devel-
oped above. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that these results do not 
allow strong claims of causality as the models and data lack a direct test of the 
causal mechanisms outlined in the argument. Future works could test the pro-
posed mechanisms. 
This work importantly contributes to the small but expanding literature that 
seeks to identify how labor informality affects individuals’ political preferences, 
attitudes, and behaviors in Latin America (Altamirano, 2019; Baker & Velasco-
Guachalla, 2018; Berens, 2015, 2020; Berens & Kemmerling, 2019). However, 
future efforts are vital. Labor informality is a widespread phenomenon across 
various Latin American countries influencing the economic and social dynamics 
not just of individuals but states in general. Therefore, political scientists that 
study Latin America should more carefully examine labor informality as it might 
have strong and important implications for democracy, government performance, 
among other areas.
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The coding that appear in the wording of these questions do not necessarily 
resemble those in the LAPOP questionnaire. The coding in this document resem-
ble the coding of the variables used for the statistical analysis of the paper, and in 
many instances, I recoded them from the original LAPOP dataset for consistency 
with the other variables and clarity.
Dependent variable:
Approval: “Talking in general about the current government, would you say 
that the job that the president (name of president) is doing is?
0 Vary bad, 1 bad, 2 neither good or bad, 3 good, 4 very good”
Explanatory variables and controls:
Formality: “For this job (based on a previous question asking whether the in-
terviewed is working or not), you or your employer make contributions towards 
pension or retirement”
(3) No – Informal worker (4) Yes – Formal worker)
Sociotropic: “Do you consider that the economic situation of the country is 
better (2), same (1), or worse (0) than 12 months ago?”
Egotropic: “Do you consider your economic situation is better (2), same (1), or 
worse (0) than 12 months ago?”
Education: Education in years
Male: (0) Female (1) Hombre 
Urban: (0) Rural (1) Urban 
Age: Age in years
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Skin Color: “[Once you leave the interview, without asking, please use the 
color pallet and indicate the number que more closely resemble the skin color of 
the face of the person interviewed]” 0 to 10
Material Wealth: an index made based on 9 items reflecting respondents’ 
ownership of various retail products. (Television, fridge, phone, smartphone/mo-
bile phone, washer machine, microwave, potable water inside their home, sewer-
age system inside their home, computer/tablet/iPad). 
Partisanship: “Which political party do you sympathize with?”
Help: “You or anyone at your households receive periodic help in cash, food, 
or other products from the government, beyond pensions?” 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Approval 2.031 1.097 0 4
Formality 3.444 0.496 3 4
Sociotropic 0.539 0.679 0 2
Egotropic 0.735 0.714 0 2
Education 10.000 4.322 0 18
Male 0.497 0.500 0 1
Urban 0.726 0.445 0 1
Age 40.116 16.683 16 99
Skin Color 2.926 1.595 0 10
Material Wealth 2.960 1.407 1 5
Partisanship 0.091 0.288 0 1
Help 0.102 0.303 0 1
Source: own elaboration
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